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1. PREFACE. 
The Meiji Restoration is often compared with the French 
Revolution and the Glorious Revolution of England, but it 
is not necessarily pertinent to compare them without due 
discrimination between their characteristics, for whereas the 
Meiji Restoration denotes a reform by which Japan was 
transformed from a feudal State into a modern unified State, 
the, French Revolution and the Glorious Revolution were 
democratic revolutions directed against the absolutism or 
despotism of " modern·State" Rulers. But it would be wrong 
to think that the unification of the State achieved by the 
Meiji Restoration was the same as that which prevailed in 
England and France prior to the Revolutions referred to, for 
the Meiji Restoration partook largely of the character of a 
democratic revolution also. Needless to say, the development 
of the currency and commodity economy is a social and 
economic requisite for the advancement of a State from 
feudalism to the stage of national unification on modern 
lines, and there must be an even higher degree of develop· 
ment in that economy for a democratic revolution to be 
achieved. In the pre·Restoration days, the land economy 
was rendered so ineffectual by the progress of the currency 
economy that the conditions then prevailing were ripe for a 
democratic revolution. As, moreover, the country's contact 
with advanced capitalistic countries, which had already been 
revolutionized democratically, was one important contributory 
cause of the Restoration movement, the Meiji Restoration 
was bound to have elements of a democratic revolution in it. 
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It is hardly necessary to say that the formation of a 
modern State based on national unification was an important 
factor in the growth of the modern capitalistic economy. 
That is to say, with the establishment of a modern state, 
the home market was expanded through the abolition of 
domestic customs and feudal systems on the one hand and 
through the inflow of large quantities of gold and silver on 
the other; while the overseas market was opened by the 
acquiring of colonies. Moreover, under the protection and 
encouragement of the modern State, the accumulation of 
enormous capital was made possible by the colonial trade, 
the development of such a degree of productivity as would 
be able to meet the needs of both home and overseas 
markets was achieved, and the development of company 
enterprise was attained. It is also undeniable tbat the 
consummation of a democratic revolution paved the way for 
tbe progress of the capitalistic economy. No matter what 
tbe form such a revolution might take in any country, it 
could not fail to accelerate the progress of capitalism. In 
tbe Meiji Restoration, revolutions of these two different 
descriptions were carried out simultaneously and coniointly. 
In the case of foreign counterparts, one, two or even three 
centuries intervened between the two revolutions of the above 
descriptions, and wbat was left of feudalism was disposed 
of in this intervening period. In the case of Japan, however, 
there was bardly any intervening period between the two 
movements. Herein lies one prominent feature both of the 
Meiji Restoration and of the process by which Japanese 
capitalism was brought into being. 
2. THE GROWTH OF THE TENDENCY FOR THE 
STATE TO BECOME UNIFIED. 
Because of the countrY's geographical environment, it is 
very difficult to determine how long ago it was tbat a 
tendency for national unification began to develop in Japan, 
but without tracing it too far back, it is possible to say that 
--_._------------ -
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such a tendency was evident in the Tokugawa period. The 
Tokugawa period was the one in which full development of 
the feudal system was witnessed, but it was also a period 
that marked the degeneration of that system. The very 
fact that the feudal system, the essential characteristic of 
which is decentralization, was so operated by the Tokugawa 
Shogunate as to secure the centralization of power was one 
striking evidence of its transmutation. Thanks to this cen· 
tralization of power, peace was brought to the whole country, 
and the development of the commodity and currency 
economy, which was irreconcilable with the land economy 
on wbich the feudal system was founded, was stimulated. 
The Shogunate retained its power by bestowing lands on 
the various feudal lords and by giving them control over 
their lands and over the people who lived on them; but, 
with a few exceptions, what the Shogun's retainers and the 
vassals of feudal lords received as fiefs was not land but 
rice, which was, in turn, received as taxes by the Shogun 
and the feudal lords. This shows that, the samurai class, 
which was the ruling class in feudal days, was devoid of 
control over land and men and held a position analogous to 
that of salaried men or bureaucrats. We have here further 
marked evidence of the transformation of the feudal system, 
and in this change in the character of the system is discer-
nible the gradual development of factors ,conducive to the 
establishment of a modern State. 
As another factor working for the unification of the 
country may be mentioned the nation-wide circulation of 
commodities_ The development of this circulation of com-
modities is attributable to the tranquillity which, as above 
mentioned, prevailed in the country in consequence of the 
centralization of power effected by the Tokugawa Shogunate. 
It was also an outcome of the nation-wide unification of 
currency under the centralized authority. Nor was this all. 
Although a Tokugawa Shogun was, in a sense, nothing but 
a big feudal lord, his feud covered districts, such as Edo, 
Osaka and Nagasaki, which played an important part in 
.. - .. _-- .. - •....•. 
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the development of the commodity economy, and, moveover, 
these were all free markets. Unlike the feud of the Sho-
gunate, those of local lords were located, as a rule, in some 
particular districts only, and these lords tried to carryon 
their economy on a self-sufficing basis in their respective 
feuds, as far as circumstances permitted. For example, they 
either adopted the policy of encouraging provincial produc· 
tion or they controlled the incoming or outgoing of commodi-
ties by setting up guard·houses on the borders of their fiefs. 
The policy of the feudal lords was not, however, the same 
as the exclusionist policy adopted by the Shogunate, for the 
object of their policies was to reduce the quantity of goods 
imported into, and to increase that exported from, their 
provinces, as far as possible. The existence of free markets, 
as above mentioned, was a prerequisite for this line of policy, 
and, indeed, the circulation of commodities was bound to 
become nation-wide in spite of the self-sufficing policy of the 
feudal lords. I call this state of economy nation-wide 
economy, instead of terming it national economy, because 
whereas national economy means a collective economy in 
which the will of the State is directly linked to the economy of 
individuals, the economy in the Tokugawa period was not yet 
developed as to have attained such a stage, and, moreover, 
while the concept of national economy presupposes inter-
national econom~ the economy in the Tokugawa period 
was an exclusionist economy. At any rate, the development 
of this nation·wide economy, closely combined with the cen· 
tralized feudal system, brought the Tokugawa period very 
near to the realization of the unification of the State on 
modern lines. It furnished a material basis for the unifica-
tion of the nation. 
The feudal system was destined to crumble down before 
the advance of the nation-wide commodity and currency 
economy. The feudal lords resorted to the policy of encour· 
aging provincial production or of monopolising the sale of 
provincial products in order to keep pace with the advancing 
currency economy, but these policies served no better pur-
. ----_. __ .... _- - ---
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pose than to prolong the existence of the feudal regime to a 
certain extent, either by curbing the growth of the influence 
of the commercial class which, parasitic on the feudal system, 
went on amassing wealth, or by consolidating the basis of 
their own economic life by entering the commerical world 
side by side with the commercial class. Foreign capitalism 
invaded the country at this juncture. It is hardly necessary 
to say that the incursion of foreign capitalism produced far· 
reaching effects in all direction, both political and economic, 
but I am here specifically concerned with the question of 
how it served to accelerate the unificaiion of the State on 
modern lines. 
One noteworthy fact in the country's foreign relations 
in the closing days of the Tokugawa Shogunate is that while 
France supported the Shogunate, Britain aided the clans 
hostile to the Shogunate. It was due to her confidence in 
the Shogun's actual power that France lent support to the 
Shogunate. For instance, it is on record that in the second 
year of BunkyU (1866), the French Minister expressed him· 
self against the idea of conducting diplomatic negotiations 
with the Imperial Court on the ground that the Imperial 
Court was too ill equipped with material resources to be 
able to form a new Government. He also interpreted the 
grant of Imperial sanction for the "Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce" of Ansei (1858), in the first year of KeiD (1865) 
as converting the Shogunate from the violator of the national 
law into its defender, and he was evidently confident of the 
maintenance of· power by the Shogunate. Even after the 
surrender of the reins of government to the Emperor by 
the Shogunate and the defeat of its forces in the battle of 
Taba and Fushimi, the French Minister advised the Shogun· 
ate to hold out, promising to supply it with the necessary 
arms and war funds. On the other hand, Britain, foreseeing 
the ultimate downfall of the Tokugawa regime, fixed upon 
the Imperial Court as the party with which to cond uct 
diplomatic negotiations, and helped the clans which were 
contriving to compass. looking to the authority of the 
• • l S 
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Imperial Court, the downfall of the Shogunate. Various 
causes may be assigned to this difference of attitude between 
France and Britain, but the main cause was, no doubt, the 
different forecasts which they made' of the future course of 
Japanese political rights. 
In spite of this difference of attitude, both countries 
were at one in their desire for the unification of power, 
and both strove to bring it about. France endeavoured to 
secure the conversion of the feudal State into a unified 
modern State under the Shogunate, while Britain hoped 
for the realization of a unified modern State under the rule 
of the Imperial Court. * Their underlying motives were 
alike in that they both sought to promote their own economic 
interests through the national unification of Japan. It may 
thus be said that not only did the development of Japanese 
, 
* Urging on Ikeda Chikugo no Kami (who went to Paris in the first 
year of Genji (1864J as an Envoy charged with the mission of negotiating 
for the closing of Japanese ports to foreign trade), the necessity for the 
unification of the country on the basis of the centralization of power, the 
authorities of the French Government said: "Conditions in France four or 
five hundred year ago were analogous to those now prevailig in Japan. Just 
as there are at the present time 260 feudal lords in Japan, so France had in 
those days numerous lords, big and little, to rule the various provinces. As 
each province had its own laws and regulations, civil commotions were 
incessant in France. The unification of the country was effected recently by 
an able Ruler, and order having supplanted chaos, France has attained her 
present prosperity. If Japan wants to increase her prestige abroad, it is of 
prime importance that the authority of the feudal lords be curtailed so that 
power may be centralized in the Shogunate. To this end, the Shogunate should 
create an efficient army and navy with the help and protection of France. 
Unless the military powers of feudal lords are reduced by the Shogunate with 
French military aid, it will be impossible for Japan to enhance her prestige 
abroad. " 
It is not clear whether Britain had similar designs, but the fact that she 
desired the unification of Japan is obvious from the following passages appear-
ing in a report submitted by Mr. Morrison, the then British Consul at 
Nagasaki, to his Government:- .. It seems clear to me that we shall never 
have satisfactory relations with Japan without going to the Mikado, and 
forming a revised Treaty (for which we have now ample experience) with 
him. The present time seems to demand such a measure, and if all the 
Foreign Powers were to unite for the purpose, it might be that the new epoch 
so much desired, and once announced in our relations, would at length dawn, 
and Japan herself be saved by us from the evils of civil war." (M. Paske-
Smith, Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603-
1868. p. 164.) 
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capitalistic economy result from the country's contact with 
advanced capitalistic countries but that the unification of the 
country on modern lines was helped forward by the activities 
of these advanced countries. 
3. CONSUMMATION OF THE UNIFICATION 
OF THE STATE. 
The Meiji Restoration was achieved chiefly by samurai 
of the lower grades. As alreadY mentioned, a large propor-
tion of the samurai class had no land in their possession, 
their fiefs consisting merely of the grant of rice. This 
tended to weaken the feudal ties of combination. Moreover, 
the rigid observance of class distinctions, coupled with the 
increase of poverty as a sequel to the development of the 
currency economy, gradually fostered the spirit of recalcitrance 
among the lower grades of samurai, culminating in the 
growth of collaboration among those of different clans for 
the achievement of their common object. Although it cannot 
be denied that the support given by farmers and chanin 
(merchants) contributed to the Restoration movement, their 
support was, on the whole, neither active nor positive. Due 
to inconsistencies between the currency economy and the 
land economy, feudal lords were reduced to finacial straits, 
with the result that they taxed the farmers heavily. The 
farmers who were thus subjected to extortions started 
movements of opposition, in the form of what may be called 
peasant revolts, on the one hand, and in the form of popula-
tion control, on the other. Although the foundations of the 
feudal system were skaken in these circumstances, the 
farmers' movements of opposition did not, on a general 
view, constitute any positive attempt to revolutionize the 
existing order of things. The same may be said of the 
chanin, that is, although they reached the point when they 
no longer meekly obeyed the orders of their feudal 
lords by reason of their amassed wealth, and while some 
merchants even attempted secret foreign trade in defiance 
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of Shogunate orders, they were too powerless and too defi· 
cient in self·consciousness to take any active part in the 
Restoration movement. Generally speaking, it meant the 
bankruptcy of the commercial class itself to attempt in any 
way to overthrow the feudal order of society, and, moreover, 
few merchants possessed any modern knowledge. They 
did not, therefore, take any active part in the Restoration 
movement. The fact nevertheless remains that the accumula· 
tion of wealth by this commercial class dealt a fatal blow 
to the economic basis of feudal society. Nor can it be 
denied that their financial power contributed greatly to the 
success of the Meiji Restoration. As wiII be explained later 
on, these circumstances were accountable in part for the 
fact that the Meiji Restoration partook of the nature of a 
democratic revolution. 
The Meiji Restoration was bound to come sooner or 
later. and the invasion on the part of foreign capitalism 
decisively accelerated its advent. Reverence for the Emperor 
and the expulsion of foreigners was the most prominent 
slogan in the Restoration movement, but the immediate 
object of the movement was to overthrow the Shogunate, 
and the expulsion of foreigners was merely exploited as ways 
and means to achieve this end. The fact that the Shogunate 
opened the way for intercourse with foreigners, who were 
looked down upon by the Japanese of the period as beastly 
creatures, did much to win popular support for the cry for 
the expulsion of foreigners, while the abnormol rise in the 
prices of commodities, which followed the opening of the 
country to foreign trade, gave impetus to the anti·foreign 
movement. The reformists who saw that the Shogunate 
was gradually losing public confidence in such circumstances 
took up the expulsion of foreigners as their favourite slogan, 
and by adroitly associating it with the doctrine of reverence 
for the Emperor, carried on their movement vigorously. 
It may be asked whether the slogan of reverence for the 
Emperor was, like that of the expulsion of foreigners, 
adopted by them as a mere expedient for attaining the end 
. --- -.' --.. -- ----
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of overthrowing the Shogunate. The answer to this question 
must be in the nagative. For those in the movement knew 
well that the Imperial Court had always been the highest 
authority in Japan and that the Emperor was an absolute 
being who could not be exploited either as the object of any 
movement or as a means by which to attain any object.*' 
However, it may be claimed that there was a certain pre· 
requisite for the fact that the thought of reverence for the 
Emperor, which was fostered by the study of Japanese 
history, developed into a doctrine and was taken up as an 
important slogan in the Restoration movement, and this 
prerequisite was that the Shogunate was gradually becoming 
discredited. It was for this reason that the doctrine of rever· 
ence for the Emperor was much in vogue in the later days of 
the Tokugawa Shogunate and that it became closely linked 
to the demand for the expulsion of foreigners. 
In short, the Meiji Restoration was chiefly achieved by 
samurai of the lower grades, looking to the authority of the 
Imperial Court. But it took several years more before Japan 
could be converted into a modern State by combining this 
authority with the political power which was held by the 
Shogunate. That is to say, this conversion process was 
effected, generally speaking, in the years from October 9th 
of the third year of Keio (1867), when the memorable 
Order of Restoration was issued, to July 14th of the fourth 
year of Meiji (1871), when the clans were abolished in 
favour of prefectures. 
** This fact was clearly grasped even by some foreigners in those days. 
For instance, Leon Roches, the French Minister at the time, observed, when 
the Imperial sanction was given for the "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" 
of Ansei, that although he had never doubted the importance of the Imperial 
sanction for the treaty, he hardly imagined that it was so important a5 it 
proved to be. He said that he realised that the influence of the Emperor, 
which was supposed to have declined because actual power had been in the 
Shogun's hands for the past few hundred years, was not, as a matter of fact, 
affected in the least. Just as he was two thousand years before. the Mikado 
(Emperor) still remained the guardian deity of the country, its main pillar 
and the centre of politics, in the eyes of the various feudal lords and of the 
nation. It was generally believed. he said, that without: the Mikado, Japan 
would immediately fall into a state of anarchy. 
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In March and in April of the first year of Meiji (1868), 
the Gokajo no Goseimon (Imperial Oath comprising five 
articles) and the Seitaisho (Imperial document indicating the 
form of government) were promulgated respectively, and 
thus the hasic national policy of the new Japan was laid 
down. The unification of the country on the basis of the 
centralization of power and the conversion of Japanese 
politics into a democratic form of government were indicated 
in these proclamations. The new Government administered 
State affairs in accordance with this basic national policy. 
One grave obstacle to its administration of affairs was that, 
although the Shogunate's feud had already been confiscated 
by the Government, the various feudal lords, exceeding 260 
in number, still maintained their fiefs and kept the people 
in their respective clans under their direct control. This 
was a serious bar to the complete restoration of power to 
the Throne, which was the ideal of the new Government, 
for what had been restored to the Imperial Court was 
merely the power of the Shogunate. In order to make Japan 
wealthier and stronger, so that she might be able to 
take rank with foreign countries, it was necessary for mili· 
tary power to be concentrated in the Emperor and for the 
military organisation to be unified. For the accomplishment 
of these objects, the national revenue had to be increased 
and the sources of revenue ensured. Needless to say, this 
could not be done so long as the various clans retained 
their feudal powers. Thus, one of the most important 
problems which claimed serious attention after the new 
Government was established was how to eliminate the feudal 
form of government. 
The solution of this problem was attended with many 
difficulties. One difficulty arose from the fact that although 
the leaders of the new Government were generally inspired 
by the ideal of achieving the unification of the country into 
a modern State, they themselves were, on the other hand, 
samurai of various clans and received fiefs from their feudal 
lords. Thus, while their ideal was to secure the restoration 
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of the rule of land and people to the Emperor, in fact as 
well as in name, their personal sentiment was rather against 
a course designed to reduce the authority of their former 
lords. Another difficulty was that not all feudal lords and 
their samurai understood in full the true aims of the Meiji 
Restoration; many of them desired the existence of the 
feudal regime unchanged. In such circumstances, it was 
difficult to eliminate the feudal form of government all at 
once, and a half·measure, called the Hanseki-Hokan (the 
return of the ruling power to the Imperial Court by all 
feudal lords), had to be taken to begin with_ This was 
how matters stood in June in the second year of Meiji 
(1869). Although feudal lords all surrendered their feuds 
to the Imperial Court in this way and these former feudal 
lords were appointed Chihanji or governors who were not 
much different in their character from prefectural governors, 
the political organization thus made was as if Japan was a 
federal state founded upon the clan system_ Stated more 
concretely, the Chihanji retained their former sway over 
their land and people unimpaired; with their former retainers 
as their subordinate officials, they carried on administration 
within their former feuds, independently of the Central 
Government, and directed their efforts chiefly to the develop-
ment of their own clans. In short, all clans formed indepen-
dent and separate political districts. In such circumstances, 
it was absolutely impossible for the Central Government 
either to secure the sources of national revenue or to centralize 
political and military power. 
Such a state of affairs was far from satisfactory for those 
who eagerly sought the unification of the State. However, 
thanks both to the earnest efforts of the Government authori-
ties and to the advance of the times, Haihan·Chiken (the 
abolition of clans and the establishment of prefectures) was 
carried out on July 14th of the fourth year of Meiii (1871), 
a course which fairly brought the process of the unification 
of the State to completion. Upon the execution of Haihan-
Chiken, the Government authorities were in great trouble 
~ •• p 
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fearing the worst, but, in the end, the Government's object 
could be attained without bloodshed and feudalism, or the 
military political system which had prevailed for several 
hundred years, was abandoned very peacefully. For this 
there must have been some profound reasons. To state them 
briefly -- on the one hand, the ideal of the complete 
unification of the State had been understood to some extent 
by several influential. clans and some clans were effecting 
a reorganization of clan system for this purpose. On the 
other hand, most clans were in such a condition that their 
financial poverty could be relieved only by means of Haihan· 
Chiken, that is to say, as the former feudal lords were 
guaranteed their house holds and as the Samurai class was 
also guaranteed, in the time of Hanseki-lfOkan, compensa-
tion in the event of the future abolition of the system of 
granting fiefs, the financial condition of each clan was ex-
pected to become better by means of abandoning the clan 
system. Although there might be many other reasons, at _ 
any rate because of the two important reasons above men-
tioned, Haihan-Chiken was effected peacefully and quietly, 
and Japan, at one stride, almost completed her national 
unification on modern lines. The whole country was 
unified under the prefectural system of government, and a 
governor was appointed to each prefecture. As a result, 
modern bureaucrats were placed in control of administrative 
affairs both in the Central and in the local Governments. 
The system of granting fiefs to the samurai was in due 
course abolished and the new system of recruiting troops 
from among people of all classes was initiated, which led to 
the organization of a modern Army. The national revenue 
which was required for maintaining the Army and the 
bureaucrats increased in consequence of the passing of the 
land and the people throughout the whole country under 
the direct control of the Government. The private currency, 
or cIan notes, which had been in circulation in each clan 
ceased to pass muster, and the national currency only was 
put into circulation. As a result of the abolition of the 
------ -----
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customs· like institutions which had been established by each 
clan on its own borders, the nation·wide circulation of 
commodities was stimulated. In this way, economic control 
assumed nation·wide proportions, the so·called national 
economy came into being, and the way for the growth of 
capitalistic economy was opened. 
4. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS. 
The modern capitalistic economy takes economic libera-
lism as its basic principle, and economic liberalism assumes 
that, given private -property and free competition, the happi· 
ness of mankind would be brought about automatically if 
individual economic activity were set free. By democratic 
reforms I mean such reforms as were effected in the social 
organization and system in accordance with this principle. 
Let me now indicate how such reforms were carried out at 
the time of the Meiji Restoration. 
In advanced capitalistic countries, the unification of the 
State on modern lines did not necessarily imply the achie· 
vement of a complete democratic revolution. Although, as 
already mentioned, it made a -valuable contribution towards 
the growth of the capitalistic economy, the principle on 
which a modern State was founded was totalitarianism, which 
followed the lines of economic policy adopted by medieval 
cities. The form of government in which it was objectified 
was autocracy or absolutism. In France, for instance, the 
guild system, instead of being abolished, was extended in 
scope to a national scale in consequence of the unification 
of the State, so that commerce and industry were controlled 
by the State through the operation of this system. It was 
at the time of the Great Revolution that this system was 
abolished. The human ego, which had been gradually 
awakening against the absolute sacerdotal authority in the 
Medieval Age, realized itself by establishing a modern State, 
and again the individualistic ego, thus awakened, either rapidly 
or slowly, has converted an autocratic modern State into <I 
~---- ~-~--- ---- - -------- -
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democratic one. 
Taking the case of Japan, the fact that, in the case of 
Hanseki·Hokan, a section of influential people, taking it as 
their ideal to establish a federal political system based on 
clan government, tried to keep intact the political and 
economic powers of the former feudal lords in the provinces, 
shows that a democratic revolution does not necessarily 
attend the unification of the State on modern lines. As 
another instance illustrating this truth, the economic policy 
pursued by ShOhOshi (a bureau of the Meiji Government 
which took charge of the economic policy between April of 
the first year of Meiji and March of the following year) 
may be mentioned. The economic policy pursued by this 
bureau was to accommodate the nation with funds to develop 
industry, the local governments then buying up and selling 
the products. By this means, it was intended to eliminate the 
merchants and usurers, who took all the profit, at the same 
time advancing the welfare of producers and increasing the 
revenue of the Central Government. In other words, the 
bureau aimed at laying the foundations for the development of 
Japan into a rich and strong country by extending to a 
nation-wide scale the policy of encouraging provincial produc-
tion or the clan monopoly system, which was pursued by 
the various clans in the Tokugawa period. 
However, such a policy was found irrelevant to the 
conditions then prevailing in Japan. At home, the commercial 
capitalism had already attained a high degree of progress, 
and especially after the opening of Japanese ports to foreign 
trade, local merchants made such remarkable headway that 
commercial capitalists, enjoying the full benefits of free 
economic acitivity, were about to attain the position of indus-
trial capitalists. Moreover, as the financial aid given by 
rich merchants in various districts was one contributory 
cause of the success of the Meiji Restoration, it was well-
nigh impossible for the Meiii Government to do anything 
effectual in the direction of eliminating or repressing the 
commercial class. Nor were the country's foreign relations 
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favourable to the pursuit of such a policy. It was the invasion 
of foreign capitalism which accelerated the advent of the 
Meiji Restoration. Although Japan luckily escaped the fate 
of being converted by the Powers into their colonies, she 
was denied tariff autonomy and was, moreover, made to 
grant extraterritoriality to foreign powers. In order to get 
rid of this abnormal state of affairs, it was necessary for 
Japan to introduce the systems and the civilization of 
advanced capitalistic countries. The Powers were democratic 
countries already, both politically and economically. This 
accounts for the fact that the political ideas imported into 
Japan in those days were those of parliamentary government 
and that the economic ideas introduced were those of in· 
dividualistic liberalism. As the luminaries who introduced 
these ideas were at the helm of State, the policy pursued 
by the new Government was naturally liberal. 
In the early years of Meiji, a series of reforms calculated 
to establish the principles of free competition and the private 
property system were carried out. Under the category of 
the recognition of free competition fall the abolition of the 
system of Kabunakama (a guild system authorized by the 
Shogunate or by the feudal lords) in commerce and industry, 
in the first year of Meiji (1868), and the recognition of the 
freedom of occupation for four classes (samurai, farmers, 
craftsmen, and chanin) of people, in the fourth and fifth 
years of Meiji. By way of confirming the private property . 
system, the embargo on the permanent sales of land was 
lifted in the fifth year of Meiji, restriction on Bunchi (division 
of land among sons and daughters) were removed in the 
eighth year, and the value of land was made the standard 
for assessing the land tax through the revision of the land 
tax, which was effected between the seventh year and the 
fourteenth year of Meiji. Besides, the operation of commerce 
by prefectures or clans, which had been impeding the develop· 
ment of the commercial interests of merchants, was pro-
hibited. Governmental instructions were frequently issued 
in this connection after June of the second year of Meiii 
1 
78 Y. RORIE 
(1899). In issuing these instructions the Government was 
prompted by the desire to prevent local authorities from 
competing with merchants for commercial profits, so that 
commerce might be left to merchants. It was in pursuit 
of this policy that the Shokaijo (commercial offices) of the 
various clans were vetoed. 
However, these reforms did not go beyond removing 
various feudal restrictions detrimental to the development 
of democratic factors. Although democratic factors were 
then sufficiently developed to admit of the various reforms 
referred to, they were not yet strong enough to be able to 
stand the pressure of foreign capitalism, if left alone. In 
other words, commercial capital in the Tokugawa period 
was not so firmly established as to be able to compass its 
own development, though it was showing signs of developing 
into industrial capital. In such circumstances, the Govern-
ment adopted a positive policy to advance or foster democratic 
factors. Its economic policy was thus intended for the 
advancement of the interests of the former chon in (merchants) 
class. The economic policy pursued by the ShOhoshi, which, 
as already explained, aimed primarily at the extension of 
the commercial rights of the Government, was soon abandon-
ed, being supplanted by a new economic policy initiated 
by the Tsushoshi (another bureau taking charge of the 
economic policy which was established in June of the second 
year of Meiji). While making it clear that the principle of 
its policy was to extend the commercial rights of merchants, 
the Government proceeded to establish two kinds of semi-
official companies, Tsusho-Kaisha (the trading companies) 
and Kawase-Kaisha (the exchange companies), under the 
control of Tsushoshi, and further encouraged people to 
establish their own trading firms under the supervision of 
these companies. The prime object of the establishment 
of these companies and firms was to enlarge the scale of 
private industries through conjoining individual capital so 
as to expand the private economic power, on the one hand, 
and to enhance the capacity of Japanese merchants to 
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compete with foreign merchants, on the other. Intervention 
in private industries was by no means the fundamental aim 
it had in view. 
The above·mentioned economic policy of TsushOshi, 
though an economic policy in name, had to concern itself 
chiefly with commerce and monetary circulation, in confor· 
mity with the economic conditions prevailing in this country 
at the time. Such a policy hardly sufficed to enable the 
country to face foreign capitalism successfully, however, 
while, on the other hand, the Government could not afford 
to await the natural development of modern industrial 
capitalism in Japan without doing anything to help it forward. 
It, therefore, launched a series of measures for industrial 
development, including the establishment of model factories. 
These measures were mostly taken during the years follow-
ing the sixth year of Meiji. 
In this way, democratic reforms were carried out and 
the way was opened for capitalistic economy based on 
economic liberalism. This does not mean, however, that, 
because of these reforms, a perfect democratic society was 
brought about immediately in Japan, for, as already men-
tioned, the commodity and currency economy was not as 
yet sufficiently advanced to compel revolutionary changes, 
and any democratic reform, if desired, had to be carried 
out through the intermediary of bureaucratic authorities. 
Again, inasmuch as the democratic revolution took place 
simultaneously and conjointly with the unification of the 
State, capitalists had not had the opportunity to undergo 
sufficient democratic training. Thus, the Meiji Restoration 
opened the way for the development of the capitalistic 
economy in Japan, but it took many more years to realize 
a perfect democratic order of things. 
5. CONCLUSION. 
In the foregoing chapters, I have discussed the Meiji 
Restoration in its two phases, namely, the unification of the 
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State on modern lines and the inauguration of democratic 
reforms. If the basic principle of the Meiji Restoration was 
nationalism, it led, politically, to the unification of the State, 
with the authority of the Imperial Court as the central 
force, while, socially, it tb.eant democratic reforms. These 
two were in accord with the condition of Japanese economic 
society as it then was, and the invasion of foreign capitalism 
occasioned and stimulated these reforms. The unification 
of the State into a modem State furnishes the forcing house 
for the nurture of capitalistic economy, while a demoratic 
revolution serves to ensure its steady development. In this 
sense, the Meiji Restoration supplied the political and 
social foundations for the growth and development of 
Japanese capitalistic economy. Herein lies the economic 
significance of the Meiji Restoration. 
The unification of the country into a modem State was 
achieved comparatively easily and speedily, but a democratic 
revolution was not accomplished so easily. It took many 
years for a perfect democratic society to be realized. This 
was partly due to the fact that as the unification of the 
State and a democratic revolution took place simultaneouslY 
and conjointly, those responsible for the operation of capi· 
talistic economy had had no opportunity to have democratic 
training. It was also partly because they lacked both the 
will and the ability to take the initiative in bringing about 
a democratic society. In such circumstances, democratic 
reforms had to be carried out through the intermediary of 
or by bureaucratic statesmen. The Government adopted 
the policy of protecting and helping the growth of democratic 
factors. For this reason, the democratic principle was linked 
to the principle of unifying the State, and politics developed 
into something approaching despotic rule, resulting in the 
formation of the so·called "Clan Government." Dishonest 
transactions also sometimes took place between the Govern· 
ment and merchants under its special patronage. In short, 
a state of affairs prejudicial to the realization of a healthy 
democratic society came into being. This was, indeed, 
-~-----,--------- -
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responsible for the vigorous growth of the movement for 
the extension of popular rights - a movement which was 
directed against the" Clan Government." 
Tbe fact that democratic reforms were ordained by 
the Government and that the formation of a democratic 
society was not a matter of natural growth - which was 
inevitable. in view of the fact that the international society 
into which Japan was suddenly admitted was capitalistic 
already and that Japan was compelled to become capitalistic 
herself quickly in order to face foreign capitalism - charac· 
terises the process of the growth of Japanese capitalistic 
economy. 
